this information under the Freedom of Information Act. Some of our competitors would like nothing better. Airbus in particular has been lobbying for a change in FAA policy - for the reasons I've just explained. So I presume you got this idea about the FAA from someone at Airbus."
Casey saw Malone hesitate, glance down at her papers. It was true, she thought. Marder had nailed her source. Airbus had fed her that tidbit, probably through its publicity arm, the Institute for Aviation Research. Did Malone realize the Institute was an Airbus front?
"But don't you agree," Malone said coolly, "that the arrangement is a little too cozy if the FAA lets Norton store its own documents?"
"Ms. Malone," Marder said, "I've already told you we'd prefer the FAA do the storage. But we didn't write the Freedom of Information Act. We don't make the laws. We do think that if we spend billions of dollars developing a proprietary design, it should not be made available free of charge to our competitors. As I understand it, FOIA wasn't enacted to enable foreign competitors to pillage American technology."
"So you oppose the Freedom of Information Act?'
"Not at all. I'm simply saying that it was never designed to facilitate industrial espionage." Marder shifted in his chair. "Now, you mentioned Flight 545."
"Yes."
"First of all, we don't agree that the accident was the result of slats deployment."
Uh-oh, Casey thought. Marder was going out on a limb. What he was saying wasn't true, and it might very well -
Marder said, "We're currently investigating this situation, and although it's premature for me to discuss the findings of our inquiry, I believe you have been misinformed on the situation. I presume you've gotten this slats information from Fred Barker."
"We are talking to Mr. Barker, among others..."
"Have you spoken to the FAA about Mr. Barker?" Marder said.
"We know he's controversial..."
'To put it mildly. Let's just say he adopts an advocacy position that is factually incorrect"
"You believe it is incorrect"
"No, Ms. Malone. It is factually incorrect," Marder said, testily. He pointed to the papers Malone had spread out on the table. "I couldn't help noticing your list of slats incidents. Did you get that from Barker?"
Malone hesitated a fraction. "Yes."
"May I see it?'
"Sure."
She handed the paper to Marder. He glanced at it.
Malone said, "Is it factually incorrect, Mr. Marder?'
"No, but it's incomplete and misleading. This list is based on our own documents, but it is incomplete. Do you know about Airworthiness Directives, Ms. Malone?"
"Airworthiness Directives?"
Marder got up, went to his desk. "Every time there is an inflight incident involving our aircraft, we review the incident thoroughly, to find out what happened and why. If there's a problem with the aircraft, we issue a Service Bulletin; if the FAA feels compliance with our bulletin should be mandatory, it then issues an Airworthiness Directive. After the N-22 went into active service, we discovered a slats problem, and an Airworthiness Directive was issued to correct the problem. Domestic carriers are required by law to fix the airplanes, to prevent further occurrences."
He came back with another sheet of paper, which he handed to Malone. "This is a complete list of incidents."
Slats Events of Norton N-22
1. January 4,1992. (DO) Slats deployed at FL350, at .84 Mach. The flap/slat handle moved inadvertently. A/D 44-8 was issued as a result of this incident
2. April 2,1992. (DO) Slats deployed while the airplane was in cruise at .81 Mach. A clipboard reportedly fell on the flap/slat handle. A/D 44-8 was not accomplished but would have prevented this occurrence.
3. July 17,1992. (DO) Initially reported as severe turbulence, it was later learned that the slats had extended as a result of inadvertent flap/slat handle movement. A/D 44-8 was not incorporated and would have prevented this occurrence.
4. December 20,1992. (DO) Slats extended in cruise flight without movement of the flap/slat handle in cockpit. Confirmed slat cable rigging was out of tolerance in three places. A/D 51-29 was issued as a result of this incident.
5. March 12,1993. (FO) Airplane entered a prestall buffet at .82 Mach. The slats were found to be extended and the handle was not in the up and locked position. A/D 51-29 was not incorporated and would have prevented this occurrence.
6. April 4,1993. (FO) First officer rested his arm on the flap/slat handle as he was operating the autopilot and the action moved the handle down, extending the slats. A/D 44-8 was not incorporated and would have prevented this occurrence.
7. July 4,1993. (FO) Pilot reported the flap/slat handle moved and slats extended. Aircraft was in cruise flight at .81 Mach. A/D 44-8 was not incorporated and would have prevented this occurrence.
8. June 10,1994. (FO) The slats extended while the airplane was in cruise flight without movement of the flap/slat handle. Confirmed slat cable rigging was out of tolerance. A/D 51-29 was not incorporated and would have prevented this occurrence.
"The underlined sentences," Marder said, "are what Mr. Barker omitted from the document he gave you. After the first slats incident, the FAA issued an Airworthiness Directive to change cockpit controls. The airlines had a year to comply. Some did it immediately, others didn't. As you can see, the subsequent incidents all occurred in aircraft which had not yet made the change."
"Well, not quite..."
"Please let me finish. In December of 1992, we discovered a second issue. The cables running to the slats sometimes became slack. Maintenance crews weren't catching the problem. So we issued a second Service Bulletin, and added a tension measurement device, so ground crews could check more easily whether cable rigging was within spec. That solved it. By December, everything was resolved."